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ON THE POSITIVE EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON EDUCATION 
 







In the economic literature a constant tax rate on labor income has usually a 
neutral or negative effect on education. The effect is neutral in the absence of non-
deductible costs and it is negative in the presence of them. A positive effect is obtained 
in the presence of non-deductible profits or uncertainty in the returns to education. In 
this model education is treated as a signalling device for the level of human capital and 
agents choose freely their labor supply under certainty and perfect financial markets. 
Within this framework a constant tax rate on labor income has a positive effect on 
education under certainty and in the absence of non-deductible costs or profits as long 
as consumption and leisure are complementary and the amount of transfers and family 
income is low enough. 
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 1 Introduction
Education has positive e⁄ects on production, productivity, growth, technological
implementation, technological growth, and it might have positive externalities in a
direct economic sense. The social externalities also have positive economic e⁄ects:
an educated society is claimed to be less aggressive, more healthy, and to have lower
crime levels. An educated society is also claimed to be more informed about political
issues increasing the e¢ ciency of democracy. Due to all these positive e⁄ects on the
economy and the society as a whole, the study of the e⁄ect of any policy on education
is a highly relevant issue.
The literature on education has analyzed the e⁄ects of the tax policy on edu-
cation. In particular, the e⁄ect of a constant (proportional) labor income tax on
education depends on the presence of non-deductible costs or pro￿ts. According
to human capital accumulation theories, in the absence of non-deductible costs or
pro￿ts, a constant labor income tax has no e⁄ect on education. This neutrality is
due to the fact that both costs and pro￿ts are reduced in the same proportion. In
the presence of non-deductible costs, which is the most common scenario, a constant
tax rate has a negative e⁄ect. In the presence of non-deductible pro￿ts the e⁄ect
will be positive.1 A non-deductible cost can be any monetary cost not subject to
￿scal deduction (tuition fees, traveling costs, books, housing) or any direct utility
cost di⁄erent from a opportunity cost, as e⁄ort in some studies. The existence of
non-deductible pro￿ts has been argued by assuming a consumption value of edu-
cation or any kind of direct utility increase as, for example, social status. In the
presence of both costs and pro￿ts the e⁄ect becomes ambiguous. The screening or
signaling literature yields similar results: the presence of non-deductible costs or
pro￿ts will determine the sign of the e⁄ect related to a constant labor income tax.
In both cases the presence of a labor income tax reduces the return to education
and makes investment in physical capital more attractive and, therefore, reduces the
investment in education.
A positive e⁄ect of taxes on education has been obtained in the context of un-
1For a general proof see Eaton and Rosen 1980.
1certainty in the returns to education as in Eaton and Rosen (1980) in a human
capital model, or Poutvaara (2002) in a signaling model. In both cases the positive
e⁄ect is obtained relaying on a higher uncertainty in the return of education and
the risk attitude of agents. If education increases or decreases return uncertainty is
still an open debate, so in this model I will use a certain return for both educated
and uneducated agents.
I assume that although human capital can be accumulated through education or
training, it is hardly observable by ￿rms. Under this assumption a time demand-
ing educational process that includes teaching, tests, exams and the evaluation of
students made by professional educators does not only increase the stock of human
capital, but obtaining a diploma also proves the achievement of at least some level of
human capital that is previously determined. If an educational process has enough
reputation, the labor market interprets correctly the signal and pays higher wages to
agents with a diploma, in the same way that educational institutions will attach to
the stated human capital levels as they are interested in building a good reputation
to ensure the enrolment of future students. Following this idea, there exists only a
discrete set of human capital levels that can be signaled in the labor market through
education.2
In my model the government will set the human capital requirement to obtain a
diploma, the amount of monetary investment, and the tuition fees. This implies that
agents that choose to educate will only choose the time they invest in education. In
reality, this is how agents choose, since the human capital requirements to obtain a
diploma are more or less known in advance, the cost in form of fees is posted, and the
monetary investment in education (quantity and quality of the sta⁄, facilities, labo-
ratories...) is not a direct choice of the agent, but it is observable. Nevertheless, the
time that agents devote studying is widely a free choice. The model can be extended
to include privately provided education where educational institutions choose their
requirements or to a mixture of privately and publicly provided education.
The model has two periods. In the ￿rst period agents choose their education,
2Firms can, through time and experience, infer more information about the human
capital of workers. To develop this idea will require a hugh expansion of the model.
2labor supply, consumption, and savings. In the second period agents choose their
consumption and labor supply. Only two di⁄erent educational levels are allowed,
the lowest one corresponds to the human capital stock generated during compulsory
schooling and the highest one to the human capital after non-compulsory higher
education. As any other level cannot be signaled, there is no interest in acquiring
additional human capital. The result is a signaling model where education is a
binary decision: to acquire or not higher education. The signal is assumed perfect
as it gives perfect information to ￿rms about the achieved human capital level. Firms
attach a concrete wage for both type of agents, educated and uneducated ones, so
the return, understood as wage level, is perfectly know in advance for both types.
The educative system works in two ways, as a human capital production function
and as a signaling device. During the ￿rst period educated agents invest the required
amount of time and money to achieve the necessary human capital level to pass the
￿nal exams, obtaining a diploma that is used to signal the reached human capital
level.
The present model has two signi￿cative di⁄erences with previous signaling mod-
els:
1. It is a two-period model where agents derive utility in both periods and not
just maximize lifetime income or derive utility in a single period.
2. Agents can freely choose their labor supply in both periods. This gives an
additional dimension to the model that is usually not present in signaling
models that involve education.
Within this framework and in the absence of non-deductible costs or pro￿ts,
the e⁄ect of a constant tax rate is positive on the educational choice as long as
consumption and leisure are complement and the amount of transfers and non-labor
(family) income is low enough.
This positive e⁄ect of taxes is due to the labor supply choice in the second
period and to the reduction of the opportunity cost of education in the ￿rst period.
Obviously a higher tax rate always implies a lower opportunity cost of education in
3terms of lost income as also a relatively lower return in terms of second period wage.
Due to the endogeneity of the labor supply the relation between consumption and
leisure is highly relevant; there is a change in the labor supply decision of agents
that implies a change in the derived utility. When leisure and consumption are
complements the reduction in wages has a lower impact on utility than when the
variables are substitutes, the relative utility loss of agents facing a high wage with
respect to those facing a low wage is smaller when they are complements so the
utility gain related to a lower opportunity cost prevails and a higher number of
agents choose to educate.
The main di⁄erence with previous models is that the positive e⁄ect is obtained
under certainty and in absence of any kind of non-deductible costs or pro￿ts.
Transfers have a negative e⁄ect on education as expected, but family income
has also a negative e⁄ect on education. A higher transfer or family income pro-
vides higher consumption possibilities making then education less attractive. This
negative relation of family income and education goes against most of the empirical
evidence that suggest a positive correlation between education and family income.
This apparently counter-intuitive result can be solved inside the model in several
ways by changing some assumptions. A commonly used assumption is to allow a
positive correlation between family income and ability but also other explanations
are possible. The educated wage might be positively correlated with family income;
this fact can be explained through matching in the labor market. A higher family
income allows agents to reject low-wage job o⁄ers and, therefore, it increases the
probability of a good match. Another possible explanation for a positive correlation
between educated wage and family income can be the access to the "family" network
to ￿nd a job. Many agents ￿nd their work through networks. The higher is family
income the better is the network to ￿nd a high-wage educated job and, therefore, a
higher family income induces a higher probability of ￿nding a high-wage educated
job. A fourth explanation to the positive relation between education and family
income is through parental guidance. Parents￿wish their o⁄springs to educate and
they will encourage education using monetary incentives if they can, high-income
parents will pay any cost of education and provide additional resources to their
4o⁄springs if they choose to educate while non of these resources are made available
to those choosing not to educate. This can be re￿ ected in the model as a reduction
in family income for uneducated agents.
2 Model
I build a model where a society of heterogenous agents lives for two periods of
length one. Agents are endowed with one unit of time in each period. In both
periods agents choose their labor supply and their consumption. In the ￿rst period
they also choose the amount they wish to save and the educational level they wish
to signal. The educational choice is a binary choice: to acquire or not a previously
determined level of human capital. The return to education is a higher wage in
the second period, and its cost is the required monetary and time investment that
depends on the ability of the agent to accumulate human capital.
2.1 Agents
Agents are heterogeneous with respect to two exogenous characteristics: their abil-
ity to accumulate human capital (e) and their family income (y). Ability is dis-
tributed in [e;e] according to the distribution function E(e), while family income
is distributed in [y;y] with distribution function Y (y). Since agents di⁄er in two
characteristics they are represented in a two-dimensional space that is assumed to
be continuous of mass one. For simplicity both characteristics are assumed to be
independent and their joint distribution is just J(e;y) = E(e)Y (y). All agents will
have the same utility function and the same discount factor ￿. As instantaneous







￿ for i = 1;2; (1)
5with parameters a;b > 0, ￿ ￿ 1, ￿ 2 (0;1), where Ci and Li are e⁄ective consump-
tion and leisure in period i, respectively. E⁄ective consumption is total consumption
in each period (ci) minus the minimum consumption required (mi).
The parameter ￿ is not present in the normal representation of a CES function.
It gives additional curvature to the utility function and it ensures that the CES
is homogeneous of degree ￿. The additional curvature is needed to avoid corner
solutions that arise when savings are allowed. In particular, when ￿ = 1 agents will
either save all or borrow all, which is equivalent to derive utility in only one of the
two periods.3
Agents￿objective function is then:
U1(C1;L1) + ￿U2(C2;L2). (2)
Agents will consume and supply labor in both periods, in order to maximize
their objective function. During the ￿rst period agents choose the amount they
wish to save (S) that will pay some interest rate (r) in the second period and also
their human capital level from the set of discrete levels of human capital that are
available. For simplicity I will assume only one possible human capital level that
corresponds to H. The extension to several education levels is not di¢ cult but
messy.
2.2 Education
The educational process acts as a human capital accumulation function that depends
on the innate ability of agents to accumulate human capital (e), the time (h) and
monetary (f) investments in human capital accumulation:4
3The result for such cases are also provided.
4The human capital accumulation function is similar to the one used by Ben-Porath
(1967).
6H(h;f;e) = q + (eh)
￿f
￿, (3)
where ￿;￿ > 0, ￿ + ￿ < 1, and q > 0. The variable q represents the human capital
level that corresponds to compulsory education. This level of human capital is the
same for all individuals. The educational process increases human capital but also
ensures that agents get at least a ￿xed level of human capital (H) that is required
to obtain a diploma.
The government ￿xes the monetary investment in human capital equal to f and
it also ￿xes the amount of human capital that is necessary to obtain a diploma. This
determines the amount of human capital that can be signaled in the labor market.
It can also subsidize the cost of education so that the e⁄ective cost of education is
f ￿ f. Once ￿xed f and H; the time investment that a particular agent needs to




















As ability is a function of time investment and other exogenously ￿xed variables,
for simplicity I solve the model according to the required time investment.
The screening mechanism is assumed to be perfect: all agents that reach the
required level of human capital obtain a diploma. This implies that, since agents
have perfect information, no one that chooses to educate will fail. Assuming that
the screening mechanism is not perfect, and therefore that there exists a positive
probability of failing the exam when the required human capital is achieved, does
not alter the main results of the model. It will just reduce the education threshold
due to the risk involved in education that is not present for uneducated agents.
72.3 Wages
Firms pay salaries according to the signaled human capital. So there will exist an
uneducated wage that corresponds to a human capital of q and an educated wage
that corresponds to the human capital H. I call them w1 and wE, respectively.
The government imposes a constant tax rate (t) on labor income, so net wages are
W1 = (1 ￿ t)w1 and WE = (1 ￿ t)wE, respectively.
Observe that in the ￿rst period all agents have a stock of human capital that
corresponds to q and the educated agents cannot signal their higher human capital
level until the educational process has concluded, what happens at the end of the
￿rst period.5 So in the ￿rst period all agents get the same wage that moreover
must be equal to W1. In order to allow for an increase in the human capital of
uneducated agents through experience or training I will distinguish the ￿rst period
wage of both types (W1) from the second period uneducated wage(WU).6 At some
points, for simplicity, I will assume that W1 = WU. The total supply of human
capital does not a⁄ect wages so they are constant. The inclusion of a production
function might be interesting as wages will be endogenous and they will depend on
the total amount of human capital supplied in the labor market.
2.4 Budget constraints
In each period agents can receive transfers from the government (gi) and they have
to a⁄ord the minimum consumption. In the ￿rst period they also are endowed with
their family income. For simplicity I collect all this variables into just two:
B1 = y + g1 ￿ m1, (6)
B2 = g2 ￿ m2. (7)
5For di⁄erent approach see Swinkels (1999).
6This requires that ￿rms infer through experience some information about the human
capital of their workers.
8An educated agent will face the following budget constraints:
C1 = (1 ￿ h ￿ L1)W1 + B1 ￿ f ￿ SE and C2 = (1 ￿ L2)WE + B2 + (1 + r)SE. (8)
For an uneducated agent I have:
C1 = (1 ￿ L1)W1 + B1 ￿ SU and C2 = (1 ￿ L2)WU + B2 + (1 + r)SU. (9)
2.5 Education decision
The problem that agents face consists of deciding whether to acquire education

















s:t C1 = (1 ￿ h ￿ L1)W1 + B1 ￿ SE ￿ f;
C2 = (1 ￿ L2)WE + B2 + (1 + r)SE;
L1 2 (0;h); L2 2 (0;1),
















s:t C1 = (1 ￿ L1)W1 + B1 ￿ SU;
C2 = (1 ￿ L2)WU + B2 + (1 + r)SU;
L1 2 (0;1); L2 2 (0;1).
9An agent will choose to educate only if the utility level with education is higher
or equal than without education.
3 Results
The ￿rst-order conditions for an educated agent in a interior solution yield:
SE =
(1 ￿ h)W1 + B1 ￿ f ￿ VE(WE + B2)
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and the term ￿ follows the expression:
￿ = VE
(1 + r)((1 ￿ h)W1 + B1 ￿ f) + (WE + B2)
1 + (1 + r)VE
. (13)















for the ￿rst and second period, respectively.
10Plugging the optimal values into the objective function, I obtain the utility level







(1 + (1 + r)VE)￿
!
, (16)
where X = (1 + r)((1 ￿ h)W1 + B1 ￿ f) + (WE + B2) is the maximum possible
lifetime income.
In a similar way the interior solution for an uneducated individual yields:
SU =
W1 + B1 ￿ VU(WU + B2)
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(17)
The term ￿ is as follows:
￿ = VU
(1 + r)(W1 + B1) + (WU + B2)
1 + (1 + r)VU
. (18)





















U ￿(W1) + ￿￿(WU)
(1 + (1 + r)VU)￿
!
, (21)
where again Y = (1 + r)(W1 + B1) + (WU + B2) is the maximum possible lifetime
income.
11Equations (16) and (21) state that agents wish to maximize their
maximum possible lifetime income powered to ￿ and weighted by a function that
depends on net wages and other exogenous parameters. In particular, it depends on
the tax rate.














U ￿(W1) + ￿￿(WU)
(1 + (1 + r)VU)￿
!
. (22)
That above expression can be written as:
X ￿ ￿Y , (23)
where ￿ is the following expression:
￿(￿) =
￿
(1 + (1 + r)VU)1￿￿￿(WU)




Substituting X and Y into Equation (23) and simplifying I obtain that any
individual will educate if:
1 ￿ h ￿ ￿ +
(￿ ￿ 1)
(1 ￿ t)











The threshold time investment is therefore:
b h = 1 ￿ ￿ ￿
(￿ ￿ 1)
(1 ￿ t)











Any agent that needs this time or less to achieve the ￿xed level of human capital











12will choose to educate.
Proposition 1 The function ￿ has a value greater or equal than one (￿ ￿ 1). The
value is strictly greater if WE > WU.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 indicates that if an agent chooses to educate then X must be
strictly greater than Y , so the maximum lifetime income when educated must be
strictly greater than the maximum lifetime income when uneducated for an educated
agent. This implies that there is less education than in a similar setup in which
agents maximize simply lifetime income. It also says that (￿￿1) ￿ 0, which implies
that any transfer or family income has a negative e⁄ect on education. The negative
e⁄ect of transfers was as expected, but the negative e⁄ect of family income on
education is not, since it is usually found that higher family income implies higher
levels of education. This apparently counter-intuitive result can be explained inside
the model if a positive correlation between y and e is allowed. There exist other
possible ways to revert this result as for example allowing a positive correlation
between y and wE. This positive correlation can be supported using matching
models or labor networks. A higher family income allows in a matching model to
look for a job during more time, increasing the probability of a good match. A
higher family income can be related to a network that is more suitable to ￿nd a
high wage educated vacancy.7 If the access to family income depends on parents￿
choice then parental guidance might also explain the positive relation between high
family income and high education, since parents￿might restrict the access to family
income if agents choose not to educate. If there exists any kind of social rewards to
education they might be positively correlated with family income.
If ￿nancial markets are not perfect low-income families cannot borrow to ￿nance
education. In this case there is a positive relation between family income and edu-
7Using a similar intuition a low income family network can be more suitable to ￿nd
high wage uneducated vacancies.
13cation for those families that are ￿nancially constrained and a negative relation for
those families that are not. This scenario seems more realistic.





















Proposition 2 When consumption and leisure are complements the derivative of ￿
with respect to t is negative. This implies that, when the monetary cost of education
is zero, or nearly zero, and the sum of transfers and family income is low enough,
an increase in the tax level has a positive e⁄ect on education.
Proof. See the Appendix.
As the derivative of ￿ is negative with respect to t when consumption and leisure
are complements, it is clear that when education is free (f = 0) and the sum of trans-
fers and family income is low enough , or alternatively the minimum consumption
requirements are high ((1 + r)B1 + B2 ’ 0),8 the derivative of the time investment
threshold is positive so that higher taxes imply more education, since more agents
will choose to educate.
A higher tax rate always implies a lower cost of education in terms of lost income
as also a lower return in terms of wage in the second period. The relevance of the
relation between consumption and leisure is due to the labor supply choice. When
leisure and consumption are complements the reduction in wages has a lower impact
on utility than when the variables are substitutes, the relative utility loss of agents
facing a high wage with respect to those facing a low wage is smaller when they are
complements so the utility gain related to a lower opportunity cost prevails and a
higher number of agents choose to educate. A more detailed explanation is provided
after proposition 5.
8The minimum consumption requirements can be quite high in a modern society.
14This e⁄ect works through the labor supply decision in the second period as a
similar result is obtained when agents derive utility only in the second period. In
such a model agents supply labor inelastically in the ￿rst period and save all their
income to be consumed in the second period. Solving that model I obtain as a
threshold time investment the following expression:
b h = 1 ￿ { ￿
({ ￿ 1)
(1 ￿ t)



















This expression is identical to (26), except for the term {.
Proposition 3 The value of { is greater than one ({ ￿ 1). It is strictly greater if
WE > WU.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Similarly to Proposition 1, Proposition 3 re￿ ects the negative e⁄ect of transfers
and family income on education.







Proof. See the Appendix.
From Proposition 4 it is clear that equation (29) overestimates the e⁄ects of
transfers, family income and the uneducated wage. In fact, the time investment
threshold is always higher in this model, so less agents educate. This di⁄erence
is due to the labor supply and to the savings decision in the ￿rst period. Agents
that choose to educate will borrow (or save less) to ￿nance education, and their
labor supply decision in the ￿rst period helps also to decrease the cost of education
since not all the time devoted to education implies a loss in income. The di⁄erence
15between { and ￿ depends also on the value of ￿. The closer to zero is ￿, the closer
is ￿ to {. For ￿ close to one, ￿ is close to one.
Proposition 5 The derivative of { with respect to t is negative if consumption and
leisure are complements: d{
dt ￿ 0 if ￿ < 0 and WE > WU.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 5 indicates a similar behavior with respect to taxes and this result
shows that the labor supply decision in the second period is the relevant variable to
induce the positive reaction to an increase in the tax rate, as long as consumption
and labor are complements. When considering this case, the e⁄ect of a change in
the tax rate can be decomposed in two e⁄ect, the ￿rst one is related to savings since
the change in taxes a⁄ects the ￿rst period wage and the second one is related to
the change in the wage of the second period. This can be mathematically expressed
trough the derivative of the indirect utility function of the second period (V (Wi;Si)















for i = E;U.










￿(1 + r)hw1￿(WE) for educated agents.
￿(1 + r)w1￿(WU) for uneducated agents.
As h 2 (0;1) and ￿(WE) < ￿(WU) the loss of utility due to the increase in
taxes is less for educated agents, there is a reduction in the opportunity cost of
education and education becomes more attractive, independently of the relation
between consumption and leisure.
The second terms of the RHS corresponds to the wage e⁄ect in the second period










i) for i = E;U.
Here WE￿(WE) > WU￿(WU), independently of the relation between consumption
and leisure. The relevance of the relation between consumption and labor is related
to the labor supply choices. When consumption and leisure are substitutes then
(1￿L￿
E) > (1￿L￿
U) in any case and the di⁄erence between these two terms is always
higher than the same di⁄erence when consumption and leisure are complements since
the income and substitution e⁄ect work in opposite directions, in fact it can be the
case that (1￿L￿
E) < (1￿L￿
U). This implies that the relative loss of utility of educated
agents with respect to uneducated agents is always lower when consumption and
leisure are complements.
Then, for educated agents there is a relative gain of utility due to the reduction in
the opportunity cost of education, in terms of savings, and a relative loss of utility
due the reduction of the second period wage. This relative loss is always lower
when consumption and leisure are complements, in a way that the gain related to
the reduction in opportunity cost dominates, making education more attractive. If
consumption and leisure are substitutes the dominant e⁄ect it the loss due to the
reduction in the second period wage, making then education less pro￿table.
A similar intuition can be applied to the case where individuals extract utility
from both periods, the mechanism is much more complicated and it works trough
changes in the labor supply choices in both periods and the saving choice.
If the same problem is solved assuming that agents care only about ￿rst period
utility I get:









There are no negative e⁄ects due to transfers or family income and taxes only
a⁄ect trough the last term related to the cost of education, so for costless education
taxes do not have any e⁄ect. This is similar to the cases where ￿ is close to one.
17Is the complementarity assumption too strong? There exists empirical evidence
of complementarity between consumption and leisure in the literature (Stern 1976).
Complementarity between consumption and leisure is also a way to explain the
backward sloping labor supply function that is empirically observed.
4 Discussion
The main conclusion of this paper is that higher tax rates on labor income can
have positive e⁄ects on education. The requirements to observe such e⁄ect are,
perhaps, not too restrictive: Consumption and leisure must be complements, a fact
that is empirically observed; the monetary cost of education must be low or zero,
something that is observed in many European countries; and the sum of transfers
and family income must be low enough to just cover the minimum consumption
requirements. This last requirement is perhaps the most di¢ cult to argue. Assume
that the reverse is true, then any agent, not working at all, must reach positive levels
of e⁄ective consumption. This might be true in some countries, but mainly due to
positive transfers and governmental help that are o⁄ered only in some concrete kind
of situations, like tagging policies. Usually any agent that works and/or reaches some
minimum level of income has not access to the mentioned transfers. Without these
transfers and help is di¢ cult to believe that an agent will reach a positive level
of e⁄ective consumption without working. Then the sum of transfers and family
income must be, in most of the cases, lower or equal than the sum of minimum
consumption requirements.
In many European countries higher education is free or nearly free and marginal
tax rates are high; the combination of these two facts might act increasing education
instead of decreasing it. The high proportion of college students observed in some
European countries that cannot be explained by the sole wage di⁄erential might be
explained by this fact. In the particular case of Norway the population of agents with
a college degree and the number of university students has nearly doubled between
1987 and 2002, and interestingly the increase is concentrated on those ￿elds that
18have a lower return.9 In practice these agents face a constant tax rate since their
income is close to the uneducated income. In other Nordic countries the return
to education is also quite low. Even when the tax schedule is highly progressive
the average tax rate di⁄erence between agents with tertiary education (educated)
and agents with lower secondary education (uneducated) is much lower than in
the U.S.A.10 In the case of Swedish and Danish women the average tax di⁄erence
between educated and uneducated is less than 5%.11 In many developed countries
the advantages that students have in form of discounts, tax exemptions, easy access
to loans, housing help, grants and other forms of subventions can make the monetary
cost of education even negative, and then education is even more attractive and the
e⁄ect of an increase in taxes encourages even more education.
References
[1] Alstads￿ter, A. (2001): "Does the Tax System Encourage Too Much Educa-
tion". CESifo Working Paper No. 612.
[2] Alstads￿ter, A. (2003): "Income Tax, Consumption Value of Education, and
the Choice of Educational Type". Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration. Discussion Paper 11/2003.
[3] Bedard, K. (2001): "Human Capital versus Signaling Models: University Access
and High School Dropouts". The Journal of Political Economy Vol. 109. No. 4,
749-775.
[4] Ben-Porath, Y. (1967): "The Production of Human Capital and the Life Cycle
of Earnings". Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 75, No 4, 352-365.
[5] Bl￿ndal, S. Field, S. Girouard, N. (2002): "Investment in Human Capital
Trough Upper-Secondary and Tertiary Education". OECD Economic Studies
No 34.
9See Alstads￿ter (2003).
10Data from OECD Economic Studies No 34.
11Data from OECD Economic Studies No 34.
19[6] Eaton, J. Rosen, H. S. (1980): "Taxation, Human Capital, and Uncertainty",
American Economic Review, Vol 70, No 4, 705-715.
[7] Frazis, H. (2002): "Human Capital, Signaling, and the Pattern of Returns to
Education", Oxford Economic Papers Vol 54, 298-320.
[8] Nielsen, S.O. Słrensen, P.B. (1997): "On the Optimality of the Nordic System
of Dual Income Taxation", Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 63. 311-329.
[9] Poutvaara, P. (2002): "Risky Occupational Choices and Taxation with Ability
Di⁄erences", Topics in Economic analysis and Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press,
Vol 2(1), 1049-1049
[10] Riley, J.G. (1979): "Informational Equilibrium". Econometrica Vol. 47, No. 2,
331-360.
[11] Riley, J.G. (1985). "Competition with Hidden Knowledge". Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 93. No. 5, 958-976.
[12] Spence, M. (1973a): "Job Market Signalling", Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol. 87, No. 3, 335-374.
[13] Spence, M. (1973b): "Time and Communication in Economic and Social Inter-
action", Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 87, No.4. 651-660.
[14] Stern, H. M. (1976): "On The Speci￿cation Of Optimum Income Taxation",
Journal Of Public Economics Vol. 6,123-162.
[15] Stiglitz, J.E. (1975): "The Theory of "Screening," Education, and the Distrib-
ution of Income", American Economic Review, Vol. 65, No. 3, 283-300.
[16] Swinkels, J.M. (1999): "Education Signalling with Preemptive O⁄ers", Review
of Economic Studies Vol. 66, No. 4, 949-970.
[17] Weiss, A. (1983): "A Sorting-cum-Learning Model of Education", Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 91, No 3, 420-442.
[18] Wolpin, K. I. (1977): "Education and Screening", American Economic Review,
Vol. 67, No 5, 949-958.
205 Appendix.
5.1 Solving utility levels of educated and uneducated agents.
















s:t C1 = (1 ￿ h ￿ L1)W1 + B1 ￿ SE ￿ f;
C2 = (1 ￿ L2)W2 + B2 + (1 + r)SE;
L1 2 (0;h); L2 2 (0;1).
























Plus interior solution conditions.
So agents maximize choosing leisure in each period taking savings as given and
then maximize the expression given above choosing the amount saved.
An educated agent solves in the second period.
Max
L2






The ￿rst-order condition is:
21a((1 ￿ L2)WE + B2 + (1 + r)SE)
￿￿1 WE = bL
￿￿1
2 .











The interior solution condition is then:
a1=￿￿1W
1=￿￿1





This can we expressed as:


























Plugging this results in the instantaneous utility function I obtain the indirect


























































and then I can write the instantaneous utility of the second period as:





Equivalently in the ￿rst period educated agents solve:
Max
L1






The ￿rst-order condition state that:
a((1 ￿ h ￿ L1)W1 + B1 ￿ f ￿ SE)
￿￿1 W1 = bL
￿￿1
1 .











231 ￿ h ￿ L
￿
1 =
(1 ￿ h)b1=￿￿1 ￿ a1=￿￿1W
1=￿￿1













and the interior solution condition is:






Assuming savings ￿xed the indirect utility function in the ￿rst period yields:
((1 ￿ h)W1 + B1 ￿ f ￿ SE)
￿￿(W1).
Once I have both instantaneous indirect utility functions I can compute the
optimal amount of savings as:
Max
SE
((1 ￿ h)W1 + B1 ￿ f ￿ SE)
￿￿(W1) + ￿(WE + B2 + (1 + r)SE)
￿￿(WE).
The ￿rst-order condition yields:
((1 ￿ h)W1 + B1 ￿ f ￿ SE)
￿￿1 = (1 + r)￿
￿(WE)
￿(W1)











24Then the optimal level of savings is:
SE =
(1 ￿ h)W1 + B1 ￿ f ￿ VE(WE + B2)
1 + (1 + r)VE
,
and I obtain that:
(1 ￿ h)W1 + B1 ￿ f ￿ SE = VE
(1 + r)((1 ￿ h)W1 + B1 ￿ f) + (WE + B2)
1 + (1 + r)VE
,
and
W2 + B2 + (1 + r)SE =
(1 + r)((1 ￿ h)W1 + B1 ￿ f) + (WE + B2)
1 + (1 + r)VE
.
Plugging this result in the optimal values of leisure, consumption and labor
supply I obtain the solutions stated in (10). Solutions for uneducated are easily
obtained in a similar way.
5.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof.
￿
(1 + (1 + r)VU)1￿￿￿(WU)
(1 + (1 + r)VE)1￿￿￿(WE)
￿ 1
￿
￿ 1. I develop and simplify the expression
as follows.
￿
(1 + (1 + r)VU)1￿￿￿(WU)





















































































1￿￿ > 0 and
￿(WU) > ￿(WE) if WU < WE.
5.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof.
d￿






































































































































Then you can write the derivative of
￿(WU)
1












That is too long to state here, but you can develop and observe that it is negative
if WE > WU ￿ W1 and ￿ < 0.







































That is negative if W1 < WE and ￿ < 0.
5.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. It is straightforward since ￿(WU) > ￿(WE).






























5.6 Proof of Proposition 5

















































































































That is negative is ￿ < 0 and WE > WU.
The derivative is
￿
￿(WU)
￿(WE)
￿ 1
￿ a1=￿￿1b1=￿￿1
1￿t
￿
W
￿=￿￿1
U ￿W
￿=￿￿1
E
(b1=￿￿1+a1=￿￿1W
￿=￿￿1
U )(b1=￿￿1+a1=￿￿1W
￿=￿￿1
E )
￿
.
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